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Abstract
Most studies of the optimal provision of public goods or the excess burden
from taxation assume that individual utility is independent of other individ-
uals’ consumption. This paper investigates public good provision and excess
burden in a model that allows for interdependence in consumption in the
form of status (relative consumption) effects. In the presence of such effects,
consumption and labor taxes no longer are pure distortionary taxes but have
a corrective tax element that addresses an externality from consumption. As
a result, the marginal excess burden of consumption taxes is lower than in
the absence of status effects, and will be negative if the consumption tax rate
is below the ”Pigouvian” rate. Correspondingly, when consumption or labor
tax rates are below the Pigouvian rate, the second-best level of public goods
provision is above the first-best level, contrary to findings from models with-
out status effects. For plausible functional forms and parameters relating to
status effects, the marginal excess burden from existing U.S. labor taxes is
substantially lower than in most prior studies, and is negative in some cases.
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1 Introduction
Most analyses of optimal provision of public goods or of the excess burden
of taxation regard individual utility as depending directly on one’s own con-
sumption and leisure. However, utility can depend directly on the consump-
tion or income of others. Several studies have explored the significance of this
interdependence in consumption. The earliest work tended to be theoretical.
For example, almost 30 years ago Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) and Layard
(1980) explored theoretically how optimal redistributive taxation is affected
when individual utility depends on one’s relative income or consumption.
Recently, a number of studies have aimed to assess empirically the extent to
which individual utility depends on others’ consumption or income. In par-
ticular, several studies have sought to determine the strength of a particular
form of interdependence here termed the status effect – the utility-impact
of one’s consumption relative to others’ consumption.1 Such studies can be
divided into two categories: studies based on survey-experimental methods,
and studies based on econometric analyses of panel data on individuals’ in-
comes and self reported happiness. Studies falling into the former category
include Alpizar et al. (2005), Carlsson et al. (2003), Johansson-Stenman et
al. (2002, 2006), Solnick and Hemenway (1998, 2005). Studies in the latter
category include Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005), McBride (2001),
and Neumark et al. (1998).
1The concern for one’s economic status relative to that of others is sometimes termed
a “positional concern.” (See, for example, Alpizar et al. (2005), Brekke and Howarth
(2002), Hirsch (1976), Frank (1985, 1999), Solnick and Hemenway (2005).) The status
effects discussed in this paper derive from a particular positional concern: namely, the
concern for one’s own consumption relative to others’.
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Prior theoretical and empirical studies have shed important light on the
implications of status effects for happiness (Easterlin 1995, Frank 1985, Frank
1999, Scitovsky 1976), economic growth (Abel 2005, Brekke and Howarth
2002, Carroll et al. 1997, Liu and Turnovsky 2005), asset pricing (Abel
1990, 1999, Campbell and Cochrane 1999, Dupor and Liu 2003), optimal
tax policy over the business cycle (Ljungqvist and Uhlig 2000), and optimal
redistributive taxation (Boskin and Sheshinski 1978).
Status effects also have important implications for the excess burden of
taxation and the optimal provision of public goods. Although other authors
have examined this point2, we know of no prior study that rigorously analyzes
how status effects influence the excess burden and the optimal first-best and
second-best levels of public goods provision. This is the focus of the present
paper. We develop a theoretical model to examine optimal public goods
provision and excess burden in the presence of status effects. In addition,
we incorporate recent estimates of status effects in the model to explore their
quantitative implications for excess burden.
Status effects imply that an individual’s increase in consumption imposes
a negative externality on other individuals by reducing others’ relative eco-
nomic position. Under these conditions, a consumption or labor tax functions
both as a device for raising revenue and as an instrument for correcting the
negative consumption externality. This paper’s analytical framework recog-
nizes these two aspects of consumption and labor taxes and demonstrates
rigorously the idea, suggested in prior literature, that status effects lower the
marginal excess burden from labor and consumption taxes. In addition, the
2Important references include Howarth (1996), Ng (1987), Ng and Wang (1993).
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paper offers three other main results related to status effects.
First, the sign of the marginal excess burden from a consumption (labor)
tax depends on the magnitude of the tax relative to the marginal consump-
tion externality. If the consumption tax rate equals the “Pigouvian” rate
(marginal external cost), the marginal excess burden from the tax is zero.
The marginal excess burden is negative (positive) if the tax rate is below
(above) the Pigouvian rate.
Second, if the second-best optimum involves consumption tax rates above
(below) the corrective rate, the marginal excess burden of the tax is positive
(negative) and the second-best optimal level of public goods provision is
below (above) the first-best level.
Finally, empirical evidence suggests that status effects are large enough
to imply a marginal excess burden of consumption (labor) taxes significantly
lower than the value obtained in studies that assume no such effects. Indeed,
the marginal excess burden is negative in some plausible cases.
Our paper is related as follows to the prior literature on excess bur-
den and public goods provision. Applying a general framework similar to
that in Gronberg and Liu (2001), it extends the discussion of the the first-
best and second-best levels of optimal public goods provision (Atkinson and
Stern (1974), Bartolome´ (2001), Batina and Ihori (2005), Chang (2000), Di-
amond and Mirrlees (1971), Gaube (2000, 2005), Gronberg and Liu (2001),
King (1986), Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), Wildasin (1984), Wilson (1991a,
1991b)).
These papers demonstrate that in important cases the second-best level
of public good provision is below the first-best level, as suggested by Pigou
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(1947). However, they show that Pigou’s idea was not fully general, as they
present exceptions to the classic second-best results, where the second-best
level of the public good is greater than the first-best level.
The exceptions center upon three arguments. First, public goods may
have desirable consequences for the income distribution (King 1986, Batina
1990, Gaube 2000). Second, complementarities between the public good and
a taxed private good may rise public spending beyond the first-best level
(Diamond and Mirrlees 1971, Atkinson and Stern 1974, King 1986, Batina
1990). Third, a rise in public goods provision lowers the excess burden, as a
larger portion of resources is transferred from the distorted private sector to
the undistorted (controlled) public sector (Wilson 1991b).3
All of these effects may lower the social marginal cost of a public good.
The lowering of the social cost, in turn, potentially gives rise to the case
where the second-best level of the public good is greater than the first-best
level. Sufficient conditions for such an exception to occur are discussed in
Chang (2000)4 and Gaube (2000, 2005).
Our paper also contributes to the literature on optimal taxation in the
presence of externalities. Status effects imply that an individual’s consump-
tion generates negative externalities by lowering others’ relative consumption.
We derive optimal consumption taxes in the presence of this externality, in
first-best and second-best settings. In some respects our approach resem-
3A different counterexample to the classic second-best ordering is provided by Gron-
berg and Liu (2001), who present a case where indifference curves exhibit a kink at the
equilibrium, and consumers must be taxed to be induced to consume at this kink.
4Chang (2000) carefully develops relationships between the rule issue (which considers
the question whether the social marginal cost of a public good is higher or lower than its
production cost) and the level issue (which relates to the question whether the second-best
level of the public good is lower or greater than the first-best level).
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bles the seminal work of Sandmo (1975), who derived the optimal first- and
second-best taxes when production or consumption of one of the goods in-
volves an externality. However, in contrast with Sandmo’s analysis our paper
considers not only optimal tax rates but also the marginal excess burden of a
consumption (or labor) tax, and treats the level of public goods provision as
endogenous rather than fixed.5 We show that status effects unambiguously
reduce the excess burden relative to what would be the case if such effects
were absent. This confirms an idea suggested informally by Ng (2000, p.263).
Section 2 of the paper presents the model. Section 3 considers optimal tax
rates in the presence of status effects, first-best, and second-best allocations.
Section 4 discusses the impact of status effects on the excess burden. Section
5 establishes the relationship between the level of the consumption tax rate,
the sign of the marginal excess burden, and the relation of the first-best to the
second-best level of public goods provision. Section 6 incorporates empirical
information from other studies on the strength of status effects to suggest
the quantitative implications of such effects for public good provision and
excess burden. Section 7 offers conclusions. The appendix provides proofs
for all propositions.
2 The Economy
We consider an economy with N > 0 consumers (households), two private
commodities, and a pure public good. The private commodities, a consump-
5Also, we focus on a broad-based consumption (or labor) tax, whereas Sandmo focused
on the optimal system of differentiated commodity taxes.
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tion good and leisure, are respectively denoted by c and l. The public good
is denoted by G. A representative household6 has preferences over consump-
tion (including relative consumption), leisure, and a pure public good. The
public good is strictly separable from private goods in the household’s utility
function U :
U = u(c, l, r; γ) + g(G; Ψ) . (1)
Subutility u(c, l, r; γ) is a function of one’s own absolute consumption, c, of
leisure, l, and of relative consumption, r:
r ≡ c
c¯
, (2)
where c¯ denotes average consumption of the society. Status effects here are
concerns about relative consumption. In this formulation, a change in given
individual’s consumption affects his utility both directly and by affecting
relative consumption. The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1) measures the strength of
the impact of relative consumption on individual utility. In particular, γ is
chosen so as to represent the marginal degree of positionality, i.e., the frac-
tion of the marginal utility of consumption stemming from increased relative
consumption.7 If γ > 0 utility depends positively on relative consumption.
For example, if γ = 0.2, 20% of marginal utility of consumption comes from
increased relative consumption, whereas 80% stems from increased absolute
consumption (holding fixed the level of relative consumption).
Various studies indicate that status effects are stronger for consumption
goods than for leisure. In particular, Carlsson et al. (2003), Solnick and
6The assumption of a representative household implies uniformity of after-tax incomes.
Consumption externalities (status effects) arise nevertheless, as discussed below.
7 The marginal degree of positionality is given by: γ =
(∂ u(.)/∂ r) (∂ r/∂ c)/[(∂ u(.)/∂ c) + (∂ u(.)/∂ r) (∂ r/∂ c)].
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Hemenway (1998), and Solnick and Hemenway (2005), find that leisure time
is the least “positional” (that is, has the lowest status effect) of all the goods
investigated. As pointed out by Carlsson et al. (2003, p.15), “the marginal
degree of positionality for leisure ... is not statistically larger than zero at
the 10% levels.” In accordance with the empirical evidence, we adopt the
simplifying assumption that households care about status with regard to the
consumption good, but not with regard to leisure.8
The following assumptions are imposed on the subutility function u:9
(A.1) u(c, l, r; γ) is twice continuously differentiable on R3+;
(A.2) ui(c, l, r; γ) > 0, (i = 1, 2), and u3(c, l, r; γ) ≥ 0;
(A.3) u(c, l, r; γ) and u(c, l, 1; γ) are strictly quasiconcave in (c, l);
(A.4) u(c, l, 1; γ) = u(c, l, 1; 0) is homothetic.
Utility increases in consumption and leisure, according to (A.2). If γ > 0,
utility also rises in relative consumption. Notice that utility grows if in a
symmetric allocation (c = c¯) both own consumption and average consump-
tion increase by the same amount. That is, (uc + u3 rc¯)|c=c¯ = u1 > 0. In
this situation utility rises by u1, as relative consumption does not change:
[rc + rc¯]|c=c¯ = 0.
If r = 1, then γ does not affect utility, according to assumption (A.4).
8A related concern regards the implicit assumption that all goods generate the same
status externality per dollar of spending. This is almost certainly not true. However,
the general result shown in this paper does not depend on this assumption. The result
says that the marginal excess burden is negative when the consumer price of c is below
the “corrective” consumer price, in which case the first-best level of the public good is
smaller than the second-best level. The relation of first-best to the second-best level of
the public goods depends only on the sign of the marginal excess burden, not on the share
of consumption activities that yield external effects.
9Partial derivatives are denoted as follows: u1 ≡ ∂ u(c, l, r; γ)/∂ c (holding r fixed),
u2 ≡ ∂ u(.)/∂ l, u3 ≡ ∂ u(.)/∂ r, rc ≡ ∂ r(.)/∂ c, and uc ≡ u1 + u3 rc.
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This assumption restricts preferences to the class where utility is independent
of positional concerns, thereby of γ, only in a symmetric allocation (c = c¯), in
which case the utility function becomes homothetic. The assumption does not
imply that any equilibrium allocation — not even a symmetric equilibrium
allocation — is independent of γ. Clearly, any decentralized equilibrium
allocation will depend on γ, even if the equilibrium allocation is symmetric,
because an individual household considers c¯ as given, and has an incentive to
consume more than c¯ as long as γ > 0. In a decentralized equilibrium, r = 1
(by homogeneity of preferences), thus, demands for c and l, and indirect
utility are proportional to income (while necessarily dependent on γ). This
allows us to express the excess burden explicitly in terms of indirect utility.
Below, we discuss the significance of this assumption further.10
The subutility function g(G; Ψ) is twice continuously differentiable, in-
creasing, and concave, with g(G; 0) = 0. The parameter Ψ determines the
strength of the household’s preference for the public good G. We also as-
sume:
(A.5) gΨ(G; Ψ) > 0, gG,Ψ(G; Ψ) > 0.
In Section 5’s Figure 1 and in Section 6 we parameterize Ψ as the G-elasticity
of utility g(.).
The consumption good as well as the public good are produced by private
firms that use labor as the only input. The aggregate production constraint
is characterized by a fixed-coefficients transformation function. Without loss
of generality, the units of all goods can be normalized such that the marginal
10An example satisfying assumptions (A.1) to (A.4) is: u = [α cˆ
σ−1
σ + (1− α) l σ−1σ ] σσ−1 ,
where cˆ ≡ c rγ/(1−γ).
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rates of transformation equal unity:
N (ω − l)− C −G = 0 , (3)
where ω is the total amount of time (labor and leisure) available to each
household, and C is the total quantity of the consumption good produced.
3 Optimal Tax Rates in the Presence of
Status Effects
Here we consider optimal tax rates and first-best and second-best allocations.
3.1 The Planner’s Solution
We first use the model to study conditions for social welfare maximization,
assuming that social welfare can be evaluated by means of a Benthamite
social welfare function:
W (u1, · · · , uN) = u1(c, l, 1; γ) + g1(G; Ψ) + · · ·+ uN(c, l, 1; γ) + gN(G; Ψ)
= N u(c, l, 1; γ) +N g(G; Ψ) , (4)
where superindex i ∈ {1, ..., N} denotes individual households and where
the last part of the expression makes use of the assumption of identical util-
ity functions. A social planner, taking fully into account the externality
on all households generated by individual consumption — thereby consid-
ering c = c¯ (or r = 1) —, would choose {c, l, G} such as to maximize
W (u1 · · · , uN). Since each household has the same preferences, and the
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welfare function is utilitarian, the optimum will be described by equal treat-
ment: C =
∑N
i=1 ci = N c. Assumption (A.4) implies: W (u
1 · · · , uN) =
N u(c, l, 1; 0) + N g(G; Ψ). Consumption, leisure, and public goods provi-
sion are derived from:
{c, l, G} = argmax
c, l, G
{W |N (ω − l)−N c−G = 0} .
The planner’s outcome can be characterized by the following conditions:
u1
u2
= 1 , (5)
N
gG(G; Ψ)
u2
= 1 , (6)
c(ω −G/N) + l(ω −G/N) = ω −G/N , (7)
where ui ≡ ui(c(ω − G/N), l(ω − G/N), 1; 0), i = 1, 2. Equation (5) states
that the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure equals the
marginal rate of transformation (unity). In (5), the social planner takes the
consumption externality into account. Equation (6) is the Samuelson rule for
optimal public goods supply, requiring the equality between the sum (over all
households) of the marginal rate of substitution of the public good for leisure
and the marginal rate of transformation (unity). Equation (7) restates the
resource constraint.
Notice that assumption (A.4) implies that c and l are independent of
γ in the planner’s outcome. The planner implements a symmetric alloca-
tion, because preferences are assumed to be homogeneous across households.
Therefore, by (A.4), the optimal allocation {c, l, G} is not affected by γ.
This facilitates the following analysis. The market outcome, however, is af-
fected by γ, as individual households assume c¯ to be fixed and not to be equal
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to their individual consumptions, regardless of their respective consumption
choice. The distortion from the consumption externality increases in γ and
so does the optimal tax, as will be shown below.
3.2 Optimal Taxes in a Market Economy
Next, we characterize market equilibria with taxes and transfers.11 The wage
rate (numeraire) is set equal to one.12 The consumer price of the private good
(in terms of hours of work) is q = 1/(1− τ), where τ is the consumption tax
rate. A lump-sum tax (transfer) is denoted by t.
As the public good enters the individual utility functions in a weakly sep-
arable way, the optimization problem can be solved on two levels by embed-
ding a household problem within the government’s problem (see, for example,
Barten and Boehm 1982, p.400).
3.2.1 First-Best Solution
The government can achieve the first-best if it has a lump-sum tax as well
as the consumption tax as instruments. A household’s budget constraint is
ω− t− q c− l = 0. Because the public good enters the utility function U in
a separable way, the Marshallian demands of c and l are independent of G.
The household’s problem consists of choosing respectively c and l:
{c, l} ≡ argmax
c, l
{u(c, l, r; γ) |ω − t− q c− l = 0} .
11Denote exogenously given producer prices of c andG by (p, pG). By our normalization,
(p, pG) = (1, 1).
12The problem can be equivalently restated with a wage tax instead of a consumption
tax. Common practice in the literature, however, is to adopt the commodity taxation
model in which labor (leisure) is taken to be the numeraire. See, e.g., Atkinson and Stern
(1974), Gronberg and Liu (2001), Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971).
13
The first-order condition for the market outcome is:
uc
u2
=
u1 + u3 rc
u2
= q . (8)
Let v denote the indirect utility function. The resulting Marshallian demand
and indirect utility functions are:
c = c(q, ω − t, c¯; γ) , l = l(q, ω − t, c¯; γ) , v = v(q, ω − t, c¯; γ) ,
where (ω− t) is the net full income (after-tax value of the labor endowment)
of a household.13
Ex post solutions. Since preferences and endowments of all households are
equal, the equal treatment property holds ex post (in equilibrium), and c = c¯.
Note that even though the market outcome will involve equality between c¯
and c, the household regards c as its choice variable (and thus endogenous),
while considering c¯ as exogenous. Let a tilde denote ex post solutions : that is,
c˜(q, ω − t; γ) is the solution to c− c(q, ω − t, c; γ) = 0, and l˜(q, ω − t; γ) =
l(q, ω − t, c˜(q, ω − t; γ); γ). Ex post (equilibrium) solutions can then be
written as:
c˜ = c˜(q, ω − t; γ) , l˜ = l˜(q, ω − t; γ) , v˜ = v˜(q, ω − t; γ) .
Let P andM respectively signify the planner’s and the market outcome. The
corrective (Pigouvian) consumption tax rate, τˆ , is:
τˆ ≡ u3 rc
u1 + u3 rc
|M = γ . (9)
13The demand functions explicitly depend on c¯, as rc = 1/c¯ enters the first order con-
dition (8).
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Several remarks are in order.14 First, the corrective tax rate amounts to the
marginal social damage of an extra unit of consumption (by a household).
To see this, we express the corrective tax rate as:
τˆ = −
N∑
i=1
uic¯
uic
∂ c¯
∂ cj
|c=c¯ = −
N∑
i=1
uic¯
uic
1
N
|c=c¯ = −uc¯
uc
|c=c¯ = −u3 rc¯
uc
|c=c¯
=
u3 rc
u1 + u3 rc
= γ ,
where i, j are indexes referring to individual households. A marginal increase
in household j’s consumption implies an increase in c¯ by 1/N units. The
social damage from this increase is equal to the sum over all households of
the marginal willingnesses to pay (uc¯/uc) for avoiding this rise in c¯.
Second, the corrective tax rate corresponds to the marginal degree of
positionality, γ (see footnote 7). The marginal social damage of a household’s
rise in consumption is given by u3 rc¯. In equilibrium, c = c¯, and −rc¯|c=c¯ =
rc|c=c¯ = 1/c. Therefore, the numerator of the tax term, −u3 rc¯|c=c¯, equals
the numerator of the term for the marginal degree of positionality, u3 rc|c=c¯.
As the denominators of both terms are equal as well, τˆ = γ.
Third, the corrective consumer price becomes: qˆ ≡ 1/(1 − τˆ) = (u1 +
u3 rc)/(u1)|M . For γ = 0 we have u3 = 0 (i.e., relative consumption does
not affect individual utility), in which case τˆ = 0, and qˆ = 1. The correc-
tive consumer price is independent of the household’s income. From (A.4),
u(c˜(q, ω − t; γ), l˜(q, ω − t; γ), 1; γ) = (ω − t)u(c˜(q, 1; γ), l˜(q, 1; γ), 1; γ). Thus,
the marginal rate of substitution u3(.)/u1(.) is independent of (ω − t). It is
14As pointed out by a referee, it is important to note that the assumption of a unique
value of γ across households has significant implications for the Pigouvian tax rate. Sup-
pose there were several groups of households with differing degrees of positionality. Then
the first-best commodity tax rate would need to be conditioned on the γ-characteristic of
a household. Such a consumption program is not likely to be feasible in practice.
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important to note that the Pigouvian tax is also independent of the level of
tax revenue. That is, qˆ is not a function of q. This simplifies the calculation
of the optimal tax program.
In the first-best case (with a lump-sum tax available), the government
sets τ = τˆ : that is, it sets the consumption tax equal to the corrective
consumption tax rate. The government’s problem is to choose optimal values
for t and G:
{t, G} ≡ argmax
t, G
{v˜(qˆ, ω−t; γ)+g(G; Ψ) |N t+N (qˆ−1) c˜(qˆ, ω−t; γ) = G} .
The resulting Samuelson condition is
N
gG(G; Ψ)
u2
= 1 , (10)
which, together with the government budget constraint, yields
N t+N (qˆ − 1) c˜(qˆ, ω − t; γ) = G , (11)
the first best level of public goods provision, G∗, and the optimal lump-sum
tax (transfer), t∗.15 It holds that N t∗ + N (qˆ − 1) c˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) = G∗. In
the first best case, the government sets the consumption tax rate equal to τˆ ,
and the level of public goods provision equal to G∗.
Consider the special case where the revenues from corrective consumption
taxation exactly equal the necessary revenue to make up for the first-best level
of public goods provision. In this case t∗ = 0 and G∗ = N ω (1 − ζ), where
15First order condition (10), which can equivalently be written as
v˜(qˆ, 1; γ)
N [1− (qˆ − 1) c˜(qˆ, 1; γ)] = gG(G; Ψ) , (10’)
is derived in the appendix.
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ζ ≡ [1 − (qˆ − 1) c˜(qˆ, 1; γ)] is the share of income net of corrective taxation
to full income (ω). More generally, if revenues from corrective consumption
taxation fall short of (exceed) the revenue needed for the first-best level of
public goods provision, then t∗ > 0 (t∗ < 0).
The conditions characterizing the market outcome in the first-best case
are the two first order conditions (8), (10), the government budget constraint
(11), and the household budget constraint:
qˆ c˜(qˆ, ω − t; γ) + l˜(qˆ, ω − t; γ) = ω − t . (12)
Lemma 1 The market economy can be induced to attain the first-best marginal
rate of substitution of consumption for leisure, (5), by implementing the cor-
rective tax τˆ .
By implementing the corrective tax τˆ , and considering the government budget
constraint, N t∗ +N (qˆ− 1) c˜(qˆ, ω− t∗; γ) = G∗, the market economy can be
induced to attain the first-best optimal allocation {c, l, G}, as characterized
by conditions (5) to (7).
Lemma 1, whose proof is given in the appendix, shows that {τˆ , t∗}, as
defined for the government’s problem above, represents the first-best policy.
It is worth noting that Lemma 1 implies:
u1
u2
|M Q 1⇔ q Q qˆ .
To see this, consider first q = qˆ. In this case, (u1)/(u2)|M = (u1)/(u2)|P = 1,
where the first equality follows from Lemma 1 and the second equality is due
to first order condition (5). In words: The marginal rate of substitution of
consumption for labor equals the marginal rate of transformation. As q = qˆ,
17
the rates in the market outcome equal those in the planner’s outcome. A rise
in q lowers the consumption-leisure-ratio, and thereby raises (u1)/(u2)|M .
Thus, if q > qˆ, (u1)/(u2)|M > 1. Similarly, if q < qˆ, (u1)/(u2)|M < 1.
3.2.2 Second-Best Solution
In the second-best case, no lump-sum taxes (or transfers) are available. The
only revenue instrument available to the government is a consumption tax.
With a consumption tax in place, the household’s problem becomes:
{c, l} ≡ argmax
c, l
{u(c, l, r; γ) |ω − q c− l = 0} .
For a given tax rate τ , the conditions describing a second-best equilibrium
are:
u1 + u3 rc
u2
= q , (13)
ω − q c− l = 0 . (14)
The resulting Marshallian ex post demand and indirect utility functions are:
c˜ = c˜(q, ω; γ) , l˜ = l˜(q, ω; γ) , v˜ = v˜(q, ω; γ) .
As the utility function is separable, the demand functions are independent
of G.
The government’s problem in the second-best case consists of choosing
{τ, G} or, equivalently, {q, G}:
{q, G} ≡ argmax
q,G
{v˜(q, ω; γ) + g(G; Ψ) |N (q − 1) c˜(q, ω; γ) = G} .
The resulting second-best level of public goods provision is denoted G∗∗. The
level of G∗∗ is determined by the following first-order condition:
N gG(G
∗∗,Ψ)Rq(q, ω; γ) dq = −v˜q(q, ω; γ) dq , (15)
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where Rq(q, ω; γ) = c˜(q, ω; γ) + (q − 1)c˜q(q, ω; γ) is the change in revenue
due to a marginal increase in the consumption tax rate. To interpret con-
dition (15), note the following. A marginal increase of the tax rate raises
revenue (thus the level of public goods) by Rq. Thus the marginal utility
of the increase in G financed by a marginal increase of the tax rate is given
by N gG(.)Rq(.). The right-hand side of (15) represents the loss in utility
when the consumption tax rate is marginally raised. The increase of q by
dq is equivalent (in terms of utility) to a decline in income by both the tax
revenue and the associated excess burden: dR+dEB. The excess burden, in
turn, will be lower than in models without status effects, for reasons given in
the following section. As the public good benefits all households, first-order
condition (15) requires the marginal benefit to society of an increase of the
public good stemming from a marginal rise of the tax rate to be equal to
every household’s loss in marginal utility due to the marginal rise of the tax
rate.16
4 Excess Burden and Status Effects
In this section we show that status effects reduce the excess burden of a
consumption tax. Moreover, the marginal excess burden is negative (positive)
when q < qˆ (when q > qˆ). Here we consider the excess burden associated
16Similar to Sandmo (1975), the second best tax rate on c is equal to τ∗∗ = (1 −
µ)(−ε−1qc ) + µ[u3 rc/(u1 + u3 rc)], where µ = λ/β, λ is the marginal utility of income, and
β is the marginal benefit to society of an increase of the public good. The first best and
second best levels of τ coincide if and only if λ = β = N gG(G; Ψ) ⇔ u2 = N gG(G; Ψ),
which corresponds to (10) above. In this case µ = 1, and τ∗∗ = τˆ .
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with a given magnitude of the status effect (as measured by γ) and a given
consumption tax rate, τ (or corresponding q). Here we apply arbitrary values
for τ : Section 5 will examine optimal second-best levels for τ and the public
good.
Definition 1 The excess burden, EB, of a tax is the difference between the
negative of the equivalent variation and the tax revenue collected.
Thus, the excess burden is the loss to the private sector over and above
the revenue collected by the tax.
The marginal excess burden (MEB) measures the change in the excess
burden per marginal unit of tax revenue.
Definition 2 The marginal excess burden is defined as
MEB(q, ω; γ)≡d EB(q, ω; γ)/dR(q, ω; γ).
Throughout the rest of the paper, we employ the following additional
assumption:
(A.6) dR(q, ω; γ)/d q > 0.
That is, the tax revenue is increasing in q, so we consider the increasing
part of the Laffer curve. By (A.6), the sign of the MEB equals the sign of
dEB/d q.17
In the absence of status effects, the excess burden is implicitly defined
by: v(1, ω − EB − R; 0) = v(q, ω; 0), where R = (q − 1) c˜(q, ω; 0). With the
externality, the excess burden is the difference between the negative of the
17As Rq(q) > 0, we can express q as a function of R: q = q(R), with q′(R) = 1/R′(q) > 0
by the Inverse Function Rule. Thus, MEB = EBR = EBq q′(R) = EBq/R′(q).
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equivalent variation and the net tax revenue collected, when the Pigouvian
tax is initially set to correct for the externality :
v˜(qˆ, ω − EB − (R− Rˆ); γ) = v˜(q, ω; γ) . (16)
Two remarks are in order. First, the excess burden is zero when the tax is
set to correct the externality: q = qˆ. Second, with q = qˆ, the government
receives “corrective” revenue Rˆ = (qˆ − 1)c˜(qˆ, ω − EB − (R − Rˆ); γ) ≥ 0.
That is, the excess burden at q > qˆ, is the difference between the equivalent
variation and the tax revenue in excess of the corrective tax revenue: (R−Rˆ).
As shown in the appendix, the excess burden is explicitly given by:
EB(q, ω; γ) =v˜(q, ω; γ)×
[c˜h(q, 1; γ) + l˜h(q, 1; γ)− c˜h(qˆ, 1; γ)− l˜h(qˆ, 1; γ)] , (17)
where superscript h denotes Hicksian (compensated) demands. Clearly, the
excess burden is nonnegative: EB(q, ω; γ) ≥ 0, and EB(qˆ, ω; γ) = 0. The
equality is seen immediately in (17). The inequality becomes obvious when
we consider Lemma 1, which implies [1− u1/u2] Q 0⇔ q R qˆ:
d/d q [c˜h(q, 1; γ) + l˜h(q, 1; γ)] = c˜hq + l˜
h
q = c˜
h
q − u1/u2 c˜hq
= c˜hq (1− u1/u2) R 0⇔ q R qˆ .
Therefore EB(q, ω; γ) is nonnegative throughout. Intuitively, if τ < τˆ , the
tax system is characterized by a Pigouvian tax plus a distortionary subsidy.
If, however, τ > τˆ , the tax system is characterized by a Pigouvian tax plus
a distortionary tax. In both cases, the distortion leads to a positive excess
burden.
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Proposition 1 Holding the consumption tax rate constant and if q > qˆ, the
excess burden is lower, the stronger are status effects.
Status effects lower the excess burden associated with a given consump-
tion (labor) tax rate. In particular, the excess burden is lower in an economy
with status effects (γ > 0) than in an economy without status effects (γ = 0).
The reason is that the tax corrects for the negative externality associated
with consumption, which worsens the relative position of other individuals.
The externality-correcting feature of the tax yields an improvement in al-
locative efficiency. Thus, the tax implies a lower excess burden than would
have resulted without status effects.
Proposition 2 The marginal excess burden is negative (positive) for tax
rates below (above) the corrective tax rate, that is, for q < qˆ (q > qˆ).
(The proof is in the appendix.) The consumption externality introduces
the possibility of a negative excess burden. If q < qˆ, the tax system is
characterized by a Pigouvian tax plus a distortionary subsidy. A rise in the
consumption tax rate lowers the distortionary subsidy (thus, implying a neg-
ative marginal excess burden).18
18If q > qˆ, the marginal excess burden is strictly positive. As shown in the proof,
differentiability assumption (A.1) plays an important role for demonstrating this result.
As a particular case, the marginal excess burden is positive (for q > qˆ) for the class of
CES utility functions, as was previously shown by Wilson (1991a). A counterexample is
given by Gronberg and Liu (2001). In their example, however, indifference curves exhibit
a kink, that is, u(.) is not twice continuously differentiable, as is required by (A.1).
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5 Preferences, Excess Burden
and Optimal Public Goods Provision
We now examine how preferences for the public good, along with the strength
of status effects, influence the second-best consumption tax rate, its excess
burden, and the relation of first-best to the second-best level of public goods
provision. We proceed in two steps. First, we show that in the second-
best setting, the sign of the marginal excess burden of the consumption tax
is positive (negative) when the second-best level of public goods provision
is below (above) the first-best level. Second, we indicate the effects of the
two exogenous preference parameters γ and Ψ on the relation between the
first-best and the second-best consumption tax rates.
Step 1. We first consider, in the second-best setting, the relation of
first-best to the second-best level of public goods provision and the sign
of the marginal excess burden (irrespective of the values of the exogenous
parameters γ and Ψ).
Proposition 3 In the model with status effects, the second-best level of pro-
vision of a public good falls short of the first-best level if and only if the sign
of the marginal excess burden is positive.
The proof of Proposition 3 (see the appendix) shows the following first
order conditions of the government’s problems in the first-best and second-
best cases:
gG(G
∗; Ψ) =
v˜(qˆ, 1; γ)
N [1− (qˆ − 1) c˜(qˆ, 1; γ)] ,
gG(G
∗∗; Ψ) =
v˜(qˆ, 1; γ)
N [1− (qˆ − 1) c˜(qˆ, 1; γ)] [1 +MEB(q, ω; γ)] .
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These expressions indicate that the second-best level of provision of public
goods exceeds the first-best level if the sign of the marginal excess burden
is negative.19 For an economy with (status) externalities, Proposition 2 in-
dicates that the second-best level of provision of public goods exceeds the
first-best level (G∗∗ > G∗) if q < qˆ. Likewise, the second-best level of pro-
vision of public goods is lower than the first-best level if q > qˆ (in case
MEB > 0).
Step 2. Here, we consider the impact of the two exogenous parameters γ
and Ψ on the relation between the first-best and the second-best consumption
tax rates. The relation between the first-best and the second-best consump-
tion tax rates determines the sign of the marginal excess burden (Proposition
2), which determines the relationship between the first-best and second-best
levels of public goods provision (Proposition 3).
The parameter γ determines the first-best consumption tax rate, τˆ . Ac-
cording to (9), τˆ(0) = 0, and τˆ(γ) is rising in γ and independent of Ψ. That
is, every exogenously given value of γ gives rise to a unique τˆ(γ).20
The parameter Ψ (strength of preference for G), determines the demand
for the public good. The second-best tax rate (tax revenue) needed to fi-
nance the public good increases in Ψ. Let τ(Ψ) stand for the second-best
consumption tax rate. Then, τ(0) = 0, and τ(Ψ) is rising in Ψ.
The key issue is whether Pigouvian taxation generates enough revenue
to meet the demand for the public good or not. If, for a given value of Ψ,
Pigouvian taxation generates revenue that exactly meets the demand for the
19For an economy without externalities, this result was previously shown by Gronberg
and Liu (2001).
20For the employed preferences in this paper, this is trivially true, as τˆ = γ.
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public good, the marginal excess burden is zero, and the second-best public
good level is equal to the first-best level. However, if, for a given value of Ψ,
Pigouvian taxation generates revenue less than (in excess of) the demand for
the public good, the marginal excess burden is positive (negative), and the
second-best public good level falls short of (exceeds) the first-best level.
In other words, any exogenously given value of γ implies a specific value
for τˆ(γ). Given this value for γ, there exists a unique value of Ψ, such that
τ(Ψ) = τˆ(γ). For any lower Ψ, τ(Ψ) < τˆ(γ); likewise, for any higher Ψ,
τ(Ψ) > τˆ(γ).
The stronger the preference for the public good (the higher the Ψ), the
higher is the second-best tax rate (revenue) needed to finance the public
good. The stronger the preference for status (the higher the γ), the higher is
the Pigouvian tax rate. Clearly, there exist parameter-pairs of γ and Ψ, such
that τ(Ψ) = τˆ(γ), or q = qˆ. For all such pairs, the marginal excess burden
equals zero. In Figure 1 below, all such parameter-pairs are represented by
the “Ψ(γ)|MEB=0-curve” in (γ, Ψ) space.
Proposition 4 In (γ, Ψ) space, the Ψ(γ)|MEB=0-curve has a positive slope.
Moreover, Ψ(0)|MEB=0 = 0. Along this curve, G∗ = G∗∗. For all (γ, Ψ) pairs
above this curve, MEB > 0, and G∗ > G∗∗. For all (γ, Ψ) pairs below this
curve, MEB < 0, and G∗ < G∗∗.
[Figure 1 about here]
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Figure 1 illustrates the results of this section.21 It shows that along the
Ψ(γ)|MEB=0-curve, τ = τˆ , or q = qˆ (by Proposition 2), and G∗ = G∗∗ (by
Proposition 3), as the Pigouvian taxation generates revenue that exactly
meets the first-best (second-best) level of the public good. The Ψ(γ)|MEB=0-
curve has a positive slope, as a higher γ implies a higher Pigouvian tax rate,
and therefore allows for a higher level of revenues (a stronger preference for
public goods, Ψ). Thus, the larger the strength of status effects, the larger
is the range of tax rates for which the marginal excess burden is negative. In
the region above the Ψ(γ)|MEB=0-curve, q > qˆ, and the sign of the marginal
excess burden is positive. However, by Proposition 1, the excess burden is
smaller compared to an economy without status effects. In the region below
the Ψ(γ)|MEB=0-curve, q < qˆ, and the sign of the marginal excess burden is
negative.
If q < qˆ, according to Proposition 2, G∗∗ > G∗, which is contrary to
Pigou’s conjecture that the second-best level of public good would be below
the first-best level. If q > qˆ, Pigou’s conjecture holds. Finally, if q = qˆ, the
marginal excess burden equals zero, and G∗∗ = G∗.
Marginal Excess Burden and Marginal Cost of Public Funds
Thus far, we expressed our results by making use of the marginal excess
burden concept. The results can also be expressed in terms of the marginal
cost of public funds, as we show here.
The marginal cost of funds (MCF) is the private sector utility loss from
21Figure 1 is based on a CES utility function: u = [α cˆ(σ−1)/σ+β l(σ−1)/σ]σ/(σ−1)+GΨ,
where cˆ ≡ c (c/c¯)γ/(1−γ). The parameters are assigned the following values: ω = 1, α = 1,
β = 1.5, σ = 2. Numerical experimentation shows that the Ψ(γ)|MEB=0-curve is not
sensitive with respect to changes in these parameter values.
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an incremental tax increase, when the revenue is not returned to the private
sector. Following Bartolome´ (1999), we measure the welfare loss by the
compensating variation. We then establish the following relationship between
the marginal cost of funds (as measured by the compensating variation) and
the marginal excess burden (the derivation is given in the appendix):
v˜(qˆ, 1; γ)
v˜(q, 1; γ)
(1 +MEB)
ζ
=MCF , (18)
where ζ ≡ [1− (qˆ − 1) c˜(qˆ, 1; γ)], 0 < ζ ≤ 1. Specifically, if γ = 0, ζ = 1.
Several remarks are in order. First, MCF is not generally equal to (1 +
MEB). Even if γ = 0, MCF 6= (1 +MEB).
Second, if q = qˆ, MEB = 0, and MCF = 1/ζ. As the marginal excess
burden is zero, G∗∗ = G∗, according to Proposition 3. Equation (18) then
shows that public projects should be pursued up to the point where the
marginal benefit of a public project (MBP) equals 1/ζ.
Third, suppose q > qˆ. Then MCF > 1/ζ, as v˜(qˆ, 1; γ)/v˜(q, 1; γ) > 1,
and MEB > 0 (by Proposition 2). That is, MCF is increasing in q, and,
for a given MBP schedule22, fewer projects pass the marginal cost to benefit
test. Hence, G must be lower as compared to the case where q = qˆ. This
conclusion corresponds to Proposition 3 that shows that the second-best level
of provision of a public good falls short of the first-best level if MEB > 0.
Similar reasoning holds for the case q < qˆ.
Fourth, the expression for the marginal (efficiency) cost of funds in (36)
corresponds to Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001, p.192). This becomes obvious
when applying Roy’s identity. For γ = 0, the numerator (at the right hand
22Notice that the marginal benefits are given by: MBP = N gG(G; Ψ) and are indepen-
dent of q and γ.
27
side) becomes c˜(q, ω; γ), which yields equation [7] in Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2001). Furthermore, the MCF can be written as: MCF = [1 − |εc˜,q| (q −
1)/q]−1, where εc˜,q represents the price elasticity of consumption demand. An
increase in γ lowers the elasticity and, thereby, the marginal cost of funds:
MCF (γ) > MCF (γ′), for γ < γ′. As the marginal benefit of public projects
is independent of γ (see footnote 22), the second-best optimal level of public
goods rises in γ.
6 Empirical Evidence
In this Section, we provide some evidence about what location in the (γ,Ψ)
plane might represent that of a typical industrialized country. Based on the
empirical evidence regarding the magnitude of status effects, we suggest that
the marginal excess burden lies well below estimates based on the assumption
that households do not derive utility from relative consumption. The strength
of status effects from various studies suggests that the corrective Pigouvian
tax rate on consumption can be as high as 30% or 40%. Since many actual
tax rates23 are below 40 percent, this suggests that in some instances the
marginal excess burden of labor taxes may well be negative.
23That is, the consumption tax rates equivalent to existing labor taxes and consumption
taxes combined.
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6.1 Relative Income and Consumption
Many studies provide empirical evidence supporting the importance of rela-
tive consumption (or relative income) for deriving utility.24 A typical finding
is that an increase in neighbors’ earnings and a similarly sized decrease in
own income each lead to a reduction in happiness of about the same order
(Luttmer, 2005). Another aspect pointed out by various studies is that po-
sitional concerns (status effects) might be smaller at low income levels than
at high income levels. McBride (2001), for example, uses an econometric
approach to find significant evidence in support of the importance of relative
income, however, the impact of relative income on assessments of subjective
well-being is smaller for households with low income levels. While this evi-
dence is supported by Solnick and Hemenway (2005), Johansson-Stenman et
al. (2002) do not find evidence for stronger status effects at higher income
levels (see Table 1).
6.2 Empirical values for the status parameter
The studies employing survey-experimental methods generally confront an
individual with two states of the world, state A, and state R. These states
differ with respect to two dimensions: absolute income (consumption) of the
individual, and income (consumption) of the individual relative to average
income (consumption). In state A, an individual is better off in absolute
terms, compared to the other state. However, relative income (consumption)
24Important references include Alpizar et al. (2005), Carlsson et al. (2003), Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2005), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2006),
Luttmer (2005), McBride (2001), Neumark et al. (1998), Solnick and Hemenway (1998,
2005).
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is smaller compared to state R. In state R, an individual is better off in
relative terms.
The subjects are asked to indicate which of the two states they prefer.
Solnick and Hemenway (2005) use the following hypothetical situation. In
state R, an individual would earn an annual income of $ 50,000 while a
typical member of society would earn an income of $ 25,000. In state A,
the individual would earn an annual income of $ 100,000 while a typical
member of society would earn an income of $ 200,000. Everything else would
be equal in both states. A similar question was posed for higher income
values (state R: $ 200,000 versus $ 100,000, and state A: $ 400,000 versus
$ 800,000). Regarding the low-income (high-income) question, 33% (48%) of
the respondents preferred state R over state A.
Given two states of the world that differ in absolute and relative income
(consumption), the implicit degree of positionality, γ¯, is defined to be that
value of γ for which an individual is indifferent between state A and state
R: uA(.; γ¯) = uR(.; γ¯). If a respondent prefers state R over state A, it must
be the case that uA(.; γ) < uR(.; γ), or equivalently, γ > γ¯. Otherwise, if a
respondent prefers state A over state R, γ < γ¯.
Given two states of the world that differ in absolute and relative income
(consumption), the value of γ¯ depends on the specification of the utility
function. For the estimations of γ shown below, we use the status formula-
tion offered by Dupor and Liu (2003) and consider the following CES utility
function:25
u = [α cˆ(σ−1)/σ + β l(σ−1)/σ]σ/(σ−1) + g(G; Ψ) , cˆ ≡ c1/(1−γ) c¯−γ/(1−γ) , (19)
25cˆ = [(cρ − γ c¯ρ)/(1− γ)]1/ρ, and limρ→∞ cˆ = c1/(1−γ) c¯−γ/(1−γ).
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where σ denotes the constant elasticity of substitution between cˆ and l. As
the whole income is consumed, a respondent is equivalent between states A
and R if and only if:
[α (c
1/(1−γ)
A c¯
−γ/(1−γ)
A )
(σ−1)/σ + β l(σ−1)/σ]σ/(σ−1) + g(G; Ψ)
=[α (c
1/(1−γ)
R c¯
−γ/(1−γ)
R )
(σ−1)/σ + β l(σ−1)/σ]σ/(σ−1) + g(G; Ψ) , (20)
where subindexes respectively indicate states R and A, and c¯ is average
consumption. Notice that G and l is the same (and fixed) in both states,
by design of the questions in the survey-experimental studies. Thus, (20) is
equivalent to:
cA
(
cA
c¯A
)γ/(1−γ)
= cR
(
cR
c¯R
)γ/(1−γ)
. (21)
In the particular example just provided from Solnick and Hemenway (2005),
our assumed utility function implies an implicit degree of positionality (in
both the low- and the high-income question) of γ¯ = 1/3. Thus, regarding
the low-income (high-income) question, for 33% (48%) of the respondents,
γ > γ¯ = 1/3.
Most empirical studies employ several R-states that differ in the respec-
tive level of γ¯. We use this information to infer values for γ. We apply
two methods: a parametric method (binary probit analysis), and a non-
parametric one (Spearman-Karber method). In what follows we briefly de-
scribe both methods and present the estimates in Table 1.
Probit analysis. We formulate a random parameter model (see Carlsson et
al., 2003) and introduce a stochastic term, ε, reflecting preference uncertainty
31
and choice errors.26 Specifically,
γ = θ + ε , (22)
where ε ∼ N(0, s2) has a Normal distribution, and E[γ] = θ. Given two
specific states, A and R, the probability, P, of choosing (preferring) state A
equals P [γ < γ¯] = P [θ + ε < γ¯] = P [ε < γ¯ − θ]. Let F (.) be the cumulative
distribution function. Then, P [ε < γ¯ − θ] = F (β0 + β1 γ¯), where β0 ≡ −θ/s
and β1 ≡ 1/s. Parameters β0 and β1 are estimated as maximum likelihood
estimators of the associated probit model (method A).27 The mean value of
the strength of the status effect is then given by: E[γ] = −β0/β1.
Spearman-Karber method. The results obtained from the probit analysis
can be questioned for their dependence on a particular distributional as-
sumption; namely, the assumption that γ follows a normal distribution. Our
second approach employs a non-parametric method in which the distribution
of tastes is determined by the data rather than assumed. In particular, we
use the non-parametric Spearman-Karber method, which in many cases has
been shown to be more powerful than probit analysis for estimating parame-
ters in psychometric functions (Miller and Ulrich, 2001). In Table 1, we also
provide Spearman-Karber estimates for E[γ], and associated 95% confidence
26This approach is similar to the random utility approach.
27As seen in Table 1, for some estimates a similar method (method B) is employed.
A few empirical studies consider only states associated with a uniform implicit degree of
positionality. For these studies, only one parameter can be identified by the log likelihood
function. In these cases, we set β1 (the absolute of the inverse of the standard error of
ε) equal to the mean of all other studies’ estimates of β1, and determine β0 as maximum
likelihood estimate (method B). Specifically, we set β1 = −1.68. To consider the sensitivity
of this assumption, we provide additional estimates when applying method B. We estimate
β0 again under the assumption that β1 is equal to the mean of estimated values for β1 (of
-1.68) plus one standard deviation, which amounts to a value of -1.226. The estimated
values for γ are lower under the assumption that β1 = −1.226, as compared to β1 = −1.68.
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intervals.28
Table 1 reports parametric and non-parametric estimates for γ (following
the methods described above), based on data of several studies employing
survey-experimental methods. The estimates of the mean of γ vary between
0.20 and 0.65. Standard deviations are calculated by the multiparameter
delta method. The 95 percent confidence intervals are reported in Table 1 in
brackets below the estimates of γ.
[Table 1 about here ]
According to the estimates presented in Table 1, we consider γ ∈ [0.2, 0.4],
a range for the status parameter that is consistent with the existing survey-
experimental evidence.
6.3 Status Effects, Corrective Tax Rate,
and the Excess Burden
In the following, we compare the marginal excess burden under the assump-
tion that γ = 0, with that occurring in a situation where γ > 0, for four
parameter sets, which are calibrated as follows.
The calibration is based on utility function (19). First, we fix the share
28A detailed description of the approach is offered, e.g., in USEPA (1993). Briefly, mean
and variance are calculated as follows. Consider k states A and R such that the associated
implicit degrees of positionality are γ¯0, γ¯1, ..., γ¯i, ..., γ¯k. Let pi be the proportion of group i
individuals that consider γ < γ¯i. Make sure that γ¯0 and γ¯k are such that p0 = 0 and pk = 1.
Then, E[γ] =
∑k−1
i=1 (pi+1− pi)(γ¯i+ γ¯i+1)/2. Let ni be the number of group i individuals.
Then, the variance is calculated as V [E[γ]] =
∑k−1
i=2 pi(1− pi)(γ¯i+1 − γ¯i−1)2/(4(ni − 1)).
33
of labor supply to full-time labor endowment to 40 percent: (ω− l)/ω = 0.4.
We base our calculations on a full-time labor endowment of 5000 hours a
year. A household works for about 2000 hours a year, or about 40 hours per
week.29 Second, we develop four different calibrated data sets according to
the compensated elasticity of labor supply (εcL). Sets IA and IB employ a
more conservative estimate of the compensated elasticity of labor supply of
εcL = 0.3. Sets IIA and IIB employ an estimate of εcL = 0.7. These estimates
correspond well with the empirical values reported in Blundell (1992). Third,
we distinguish data sets according to the base value of γ. Sets IA and IIA
employ γ = 0, and sets IB and IIB employ γ = 0.3. Normalizing α to unity,
we calibrate values for β and σ for all four parameter sets at τ = 0.2. Those
values are shown in Table A.1 in Appendix A.8.
For all four parameter sets — given the respective values for α, β, σ —
we consider five values for the status parameter (γ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4),
and four values for the tax rate (τ = 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5) each, and calculate
the marginal excess burden.30
For γ = 0, parameter sets IA and IB (low compensated elasticity of labor
supply) imply a marginal excess burden of 7 to 27 cents (depending on the
marginal tax rate), which corresponds to estimates offered by Hansson and
Stuart (1985). These estimates can be viewed as a lower bound for empirical
29Among others, this estimate is used by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) for their analyses
of dynamic fiscal policy.
30For parameter set IA, εcL = 0.3 and the labor share equals 0.4 (as calibrated) only
when γ = 0 and τ = 0.2. The compensated labor elasticity and the labor share attain
slightly different values when γ > 0 or τ > 0.2. This follows from the fact that the same
calibrated values of α, β, σ are applied for all calculations of the marginal excess burdens
(for all considered values of τ and γ), based on parameter set IA. Analogue reasoning
holds for the other parameter sets.
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estimates of the marginal excess burden. For γ = 0, parameter sets IIA and
IIB (high compensated elasticity of labor supply) imply a marginal excess
burden of 17 cents to US$ 1.57, which is more in line with estimates given
by Browning (1976) that we view as an upper bound on empirical estimates
of the marginal excess burden.31
Table 2 presents the marginal excess burdens (in US$) per additional dol-
lar of revenue raised, for four tax rates and several levels of γ.
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 2 shows that for all parameter sets, the marginal excess burden
decreases substantially in the status parameter γ. Moreover, it becomes
negative, when the actual tax rate falls short of the corrective tax rate.32
In view of the uncertainties regarding the values for γ and εcL, it is not
possible to pinpoint the excess burden associated with any given tax rate τ .
However, in light of our assessment that γ is likely to fall within the range
of .2 to .4, Table 2 suggests that status effects have a significant impact on
excess burden. In IA, when the consumption tax rate τ is 0.4, the excess
burden is 0.14 when there are no status effects, but falls to 0.08 or 0 when
γ is 0.2 or 0.4, respectively. Moreover, the possibility of a negative marginal
31In between are most other estimates of the marginal excess burden, including Ballard
et al. (1985), or Campbell (1975).
32The impact of status effects on the percentage change of the marginal excess burden
is not very sensitive to the compensated elasticity of labor supply. All percentage changes
derived from Table 2 for εcL = 0.3 are quite similar to those for εcL = 0.7.
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excess burden cannot be ruled out. In this case, “level reversal” occurs: that
is, according to Proposition 3, the second-best level of public goods provision
exceeds the first best level.
7 Conclusions
This paper addresses analytically and empirically the implications of status
effects for the excess burden of a consumption tax and for the optimal levels
of public goods provision.
The analytical framework indicates that the excess burden of a consump-
tion tax is reduced by the status externality, because the tax not only serves
a revenue-raising purpose but also an externality-correcting purpose. More-
over, for tax rates below the Pigouvian corrective tax rate, the marginal
excess burden becomes negative. A negative marginal excess burden im-
plies that the second-best level of optimal public goods provision exceeds the
first-best level.
In our empirical investigation we find that a plausible range for the status
parameter γ (the marginal degree of positionality) is between 0.2 to 0.4.
When γ is in this range and when utility functions have the CES form, even
moderate levels of the status parameter substantially reduce the marginal
excess burden. From these results, one cannot rule out the possibility that
the marginal excess burden is negative.
The model can be extended to account for other potential interdependen-
cies and related externalities, such as network externalities. Moreover, with
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minor changes in notation, the model can be applied to a wage tax instead
of a consumption tax.
These results raise some general philosophical issues. Even if status ef-
fects imply much lower (or negative) excess burdens than would be implied
by analyses that assume independent preferences, some might question the
normative standing of these results. That is, it could be argued that envy
and other concerns about relative position should not form a basis for de-
ciding on tax rates and public good levels. This ethical issue is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, we would point out that, to the extent that
one puts weight on the criterion of economic efficiency, one seems obliged to
take these excess burden results seriously.
We note the following limitations in this analysis. First, households are
homogeneous. It would be useful to extend the model to consider cases in-
volving heterogeneous households. In addition, while we have taken some
steps toward estimating the magnitude of status effects, considerable scope
remains for developing better estimates. Our analysis relied on studies in
which individuals merely indicated which of two states is preferred. A great
deal more information could be obtained – and estimates of the status pa-
rameter could be much improved – if households were asked for preferences
across a range of states in which relative and absolute consumption (or in-
come) were varied systematically.
A related issue regards differing marginal degrees of positionality across
consumption goods, in which case a uniform broad-based consumption tax
would not generate a first-best outcome. One question for future research
then is to identify the conditions for which the marginal excess burden is
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negative.
Notwithstanding these limitations, we hope this study clarifies the impact
of status effects on excess burden and public good provision, both theoreti-
cally and empirically, and can contribute to future discussions of tax reform
and public goods evaluation.
Appendix
A.1 Derivation of FOC (10). By homotheticity (ex post) of preferences, we
know that c˜(qˆ, ω− t; γ) = (ω− t) c˜(qˆ, 1; γ), l˜(qˆ, ω− t; γ) = (ω− t) l˜(qˆ, 1; γ),
v˜(qˆ, ω − t; γ) = (ω − t) v˜(qˆ, 1; γ). Define ζ ≡ [1 − (qˆ − 1) c˜(qˆ, 1; γ)]. Then
the government budget constraint can be written as:
t(G) =
G
N ζ
− (1− ζ)
ζ
ω . (11’)
Notice that tG ≡ (∂ t/∂ G) = 1/(N ζ).
The government chooses G such as to maximize (indirect) utility:
V = v˜(qˆ, ω − t(G); γ) + g(G; Ψ) .
Notice that ∂ v˜(qˆ, ω−t(G); γ)/∂ G = ∂ (ω−t(G))v˜(qˆ, 1; γ)/∂ G = −tG v˜(qˆ, 1; γ).
Obviously, ∂ V/∂ G = 0 implies (10’).
Equivalently, V = u(c˜(qˆ, ω− t(G); γ), l˜(qˆ, ω− t(G); γ), 1; γ)+ g(G; Ψ). Differ-
entiation with respect toG yields ∂ V/∂ G = −tG [u1(.) c˜(qˆ, 1; γ)+u2 l˜(qˆ, 1; γ)]+
gG(G; Ψ). Therefore, ∂ V/∂ G = 0 implies:
u2
[
u1
u2
|{M, q=qˆ} c˜(qˆ, 1; γ) + l˜(qˆ, 1; γ)
]
1
N ζ
= gG(G; Ψ) ,
which, by Lemma 1 (which is stated after equation (12) in the main text),
amounts to
u2
[
c˜(qˆ, 1; γ) + l˜(qˆ, 1; γ)
] 1
N ζ
= gG(G; Ψ) .
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The household budget constraint together with homotheticity of preferences
implies: qˆ c˜(qˆ, 1; γ) + l˜(qˆ, 1; γ) = 1. Add [1− qˆ c˜(qˆ, 1; γ)− l˜(qˆ, 1; γ)], which
equals zero, to the expression in square brackets above:
u2 [1− (qˆ − 1) c˜(qˆ, 1; γ)] 1
N ζ
= gG(G; Ψ) .
Consider the definition of ζ. Then,
N
gG(G; Ψ)
u2
= 1 ,
which is the first order condition (10).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1.
The first part of Lemma 1 follows directly from (5), (8), and (9).
Second part of Lemma 1. Conditions (5) – (7) characterize the planner’s
outcome. We have to show that (8) and (10) – (12) imply (5) – (7). Consider
q = qˆ, and t = t∗. Then, we have to prove that the government budget
constraint together with the household budget constraint (both at τ = τˆ and
t = t∗) imply the resource constraint. That is33,
[ω − t∗ = qˆ c˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) + l˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ)] ∧
[t∗ + (qˆ − 1) c˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) = G∗/N ]⇒
[ω −G∗/N = c(1, ω −G∗/N ; γ) + l(1, ω −G∗/N ; γ)] .
In the household budget constraint, substitute for the first t∗: t∗ = G∗/N −
(qˆ − 1)(ω − t∗) c˜(qˆ, 1; γ). The household budget constraint becomes:
ω −G∗/N = c˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) + l˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) .
It remains to show that
c˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) + l˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) = c(1, ω −G∗/N ; γ) + l(1, ω −G∗/N ; γ) .
33Indeed c(1, ω−G∗/N ; γ) = c(1, ω−G∗/N ; 0), and l(1, ω−G∗/N ; γ) =
l(1, ω − G∗/N ; 0), as the planner takes into account that c = c¯, prior to
calculating optimal demands.
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The government budget constraint implies: ω − t∗ = (ω −G∗/N)/ζ. There-
fore, the household budget constraint becomes:
c˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) + l˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) = ω −G∗/N = ζ (ω − t∗) , thus,
c˜(qˆ, 1; γ) + l˜(qˆ, 1; γ) = ζ . (23)
Monotonicity assumption (A.2) implies that for all prices and incomes, the
budget constraint binds:
c(1, ζ; γ) + l(1, ζ; γ) = ζ . (24)
Equations (23) and (24) together:
c˜(qˆ, 1; γ) + l˜(qˆ, 1; γ) = c(1, ζ; γ) + l(1, ζ; γ) , or,
c˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) + l˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) = c(1, ζ (ω − t∗); γ) + l(1, ζ (ω − t∗); γ) .
As ζ (ω − t∗) = (ω −G∗/N):
c˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) + l˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ) = c(1, ω −G∗/N ; γ) + l(1, ω −G∗/N ; γ) .
Q.E.D.
A.3 Derivation of the Excess Burden and Expenditure Function.
We can (implicitly) define the excess burden by: v˜(qˆ, ω − EB − Rn; γ) =
v˜(q, ω; γ), where R is consumption tax revenue, Rn (net revenue) denotes
the consumption tax revenue collected in excess of “corrective tax revenue”,
Rˆ. Formally, Rn ≡ R− Rˆ = (q− 1) c˜(q, ω; γ)− Rˆ, where we define Rˆ as the
solution to Rˆ− (qˆ − 1) c˜(qˆ, ω −Rn −EB; γ) = 0.34 Denote the expenditure
function by e(.). Then: e(qˆ, v˜(qˆ, ω − EB − Rn; γ); γ) = ω − EB − Rn
(important properties of the expenditure function are given below). Taking
(16) into consideration,
EB(q, ω; γ) = ω − e(qˆ, v˜(q, ω; γ); γ)−Rn(q, ω; γ) . (25)
34It is important to note that the corrective tax revenue, Rˆ is not indepen-
dent of q. A rise in q lowers c˜(.) and thereby the tax revenue collected by
the Pigouvian tax.
40
Next, we rewrite (25), useing the fact that v˜(q, ω; γ) = v˜(qˆ, ω −EB − (R−
Rˆ); γ):
EB = e(q, v˜(q, ω; γ); γ)− e(qˆ, v˜(qˆ, ω − EB −Rn; γ); γ)− (R− Rˆ) .
Surely, e(q, v˜(q, ω; γ); γ) = v˜(q, ω; γ)e(q, 1; γ) = v˜(q, ω; γ)[q c˜h(q, 1; γ)+l˜h(q, 1; γ)],
and e(qˆ, v˜(q, ω; γ); γ) = v˜(q, ω; γ)[qˆ c˜h(qˆ, 1; γ) + l˜h(qˆ, 1; γ)]. Also,
R− Rˆ = (q − 1)c˜(q, ω; γ)− (qˆ − 1)c˜(qˆ, ω − EB − (R− Rˆ); γ)
= (q − 1)c˜h(q, v˜(q, ω; γ); γ)− (qˆ − 1)c˜h(qˆ, v˜(qˆ, ω − EB − (R− Rˆ); γ); γ)
= v˜(q, ω; γ)
[
(q − 1)c˜h(q, 1; γ)− (qˆ − 1)c˜h(qˆ, 1; γ)] ,
where the last equality uses homogeneity and the relationship v˜(q, ω; γ) =
v˜(qˆ, ω − EB − (R − Rˆ); γ). Putting the expressions for e(q, v˜(q, ω; γ); γ),
e(qˆ, v˜(q, ω; γ); γ), and (R− Rˆ) together, yields equation (17).
Lemma 2 (Expenditure Function) The expenditure function e(q, u; γ) is:
(i) strictly increasing in u and q,
(ii) concave in q,
(iii) strictly increasing in γ.
Properties (i) and (ii) of the expenditure function are standard properties
and they can be derived following the usual approaches in microeconomics
textbooks.
Property (iii). Indirect utility decreases in q: v˜q(q, ω; γ) < 0. Consider
γ′ > γ. As γ indexes the strength of a negative consumption externality:
v˜(q, ω; γ′) < v˜(q, ω; γ). As v˜(.) is continuous, we can find q− < q < q+ such
that: v˜(q, ω; γ′) < v˜(q−, ω; γ′) = v˜(q+, ω; γ) < v˜(q, ω; γ). We also observe
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that e(q−, v˜(q−, ω; γ′); γ′) = e(q+, v˜(q+, ω; γ); γ) = ω. Let v¯ ≡ v˜(q−, ω; γ′) =
v˜(q+, ω; γ). Then: e(q, v¯; γ′) > e(q−, v¯; γ′) = e(q+, v¯; γ) > e(q, v¯; γ). Thus,
e(q, v¯; γ′) > e(q, v¯; γ). Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1. Define ∆ ≡ [c˜h(q, 1; γ) + l˜h(q, 1; γ) −
c˜h(qˆ, 1; γ)− l˜h(qˆ, 1; γ)]. Then, by (17), the excess burden is:
EB(q, ω; γ) = v˜(q, ω; γ)∆ , and
dEB(q, ω; γ)
d γ
= v˜γ(q, ω; γ)EB(q, ω; γ)/v˜(q, ω; γ) + v˜(q, ω; γ)∆γ .
As status effects represent a negative externality, v˜γ(q, ω; γ) < 0. More-
over, both the excess burden and indirect utility are nonnegative. The
first term on the right hand side is therefore negative. It remains to show
that ∆γ|q>qˆ is negative as well. Observe that c˜hγ > 0, as every consumer
needs to rise consumption to keep utility constant at unity. Moreover,
u(c˜h(q, 1; γ), l˜h(q, 1; γ), 1; γ) ≡ 1, thus, u1/u2 c˜hγ + l˜hγ = 0. Lemma 1 implies:
u1/u2 R 1⇔ q R qˆ.
d∆
d γ
= c˜hγ(q, 1; γ) + l˜
h
γ(q, 1; γ) = c˜
h
γ(q, 1; γ)−
u1
u2
c˜hγ(q, 1; γ)
= c˜hγ(q, 1; γ)
(
1− u1
u2
)
R 0⇔ q Q qˆ .
Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2. The sign of the marginal excess burden is
equal to the sign of dEB/d q (see footnote 17). Without loss of generality,
we assume: v(.) > 0. We distinguish two main cases: q ≤ qˆ (Case 1), and
q > qˆ (Case 2). We proceed as follows.
Step 1. Show MEB ≤ 0 if q ≤ qˆ (Case 1).
Step 2. Develop a general condition for MEB > 0 when q > qˆ (Case 2).
Step 3. Show MEB > 0 when q > qˆ.
Step 1. Show MEB ≤ 0 when q ≤ qˆ.
dEB(q, ω; γ)
d q
= v˜q(q, ω; γ)EB(q, ω; γ)/v˜(q, ω; γ) + v˜(q, ω; γ)∆q ,
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where ∆ is defined as in the proof of Proposition 1. Indirect utility is non-
increasing in q: v˜q ≤ 0. That is, the first expression on the right hand side
above is nonpositive. As v(.) > 0, we need to show that ∆q ≤ 0 when q ≤ qˆ.
First, we note that u(.) is twice continuously differentiable and strictly
concave. As shown by Dierker (1982, p. 573), it follows that compensated
consumption is strictly decreasing in q: c˜hq < 0. Next, Lemma 1 implies:
u1/u2 R 1⇔ q R qˆ. Therefore, ∆ is decreasing in q when q < qˆ, and it does
not change in q if q = qˆ:
∆q = c˜
h
q (q, 1; γ) + l˜
h
q (q, 1; γ) = c˜
h
q (q, 1; γ)− u1/u2 c˜hq (q, 1; γ)
= c˜hq (q, 1; γ)
(
1− u1
u2
)
R 0⇔ q R qˆ .
Thus, if q < qˆ, MEB < 0. If q = qˆ, MEB = 0, as EB|q=qˆ = 0.
Step 2. Develop a general condition for MEB > 0, when q > qˆ.
For q > qˆ, we want to demonstrate that:
EBq = vq(.)∆(q) + v(.)∆q(q) = v(.)
[
vq(.)
v(.)
∆(q) + ∆q(q)
]
> 0 .
We introduce the unit expenditure function: b(q) ≡ e(q, 1; γ) = q c˜h(q, 1; γ)+
l˜h(q, 1; γ). As e(q, v(q, ω; γ); γ) ≡ ω, we know that v(q, ω; γ) e(q, 1; γ) ≡ ω
(by homogeneity), thus, v(q, ω; γ) b(q) ≡ ω. Therefore, vq(q, 1; γ) b(q) +
v(q, 1; γ) b′(q) = 0. From these considerations, it follows that we need to
show:
−b
′(q)
b(q)
∆(q) + ∆q(q) > 0⇔ b(q)
q
∆q(q)− b′(q) ∆(q)
q
> 0 . (26)
Step 3. Show MEB > 0 when q > qˆ.
(i) As b(q) is strictly concave, it follows that b(q)/q > b′(q). Thus, a sufficient
condition for (26) to hold is:
d∆(q)
d q
≥ ∆(q)
q
. (27)
Notice that ∆(qˆ) = 0, and ∆q(q) > 0 for all q > qˆ. At qˆ:
d∆(q)
d q
=
∆(q)−∆(qˆ)
q − qˆ =
∆(q)
q − qˆ >
∆(q)
q
, q > qˆ . (28)
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Thus, the sufficient condition (27) holds and the marginal excess burden is
strictly positive when the tax rate is raised from qˆ to any q > qˆ, as claimed
in Proposition 2.
(ii) If the tax rate is raised from some q > qˆ, then the marginal excess burden
is positive, if and only if
− εc˜h,q >
q
q − 1 − ε∆,q
[
1 +
c˜h(qˆ) + l˜h(qˆ)
(q − 1)c˜h(q)
]
, (29)
where εc˜h,q ≡
c˜hq (q) q
c˜h(q)
, ε∆,q ≡ ∆q(q) q
∆(q)
represent price elasticities. To see this, we observe that ∆(q) > 0 and
b(q) > 0, and notice that necessary and sufficient condition (26) amounts
to: ∆q(q)/∆(q) > b
′(q)/b(q). Considering that b(q) = ∆(q) + (q − 1) c˜h(q) +
c˜h(qˆ) + l˜h(qˆ), b′(q) = ∆q(q) + (q − 1)c˜hq (q) + c˜h(q), and employing the defini-
tions for the elasticities from above yields inequality (29).
Remark. Elasticity ε∆,q > 0, as ∆q(q) > 0 for all q > qˆ. In particular,
limq−>qˆ ε∆,q = limq−>qˆ [q∆q(q)]/∆(q) = limq−>qˆ [q∆q,q(q)]/∆q(q) = +∞. In
the derivation, we employ l’Hoˆpital’s rule, as qˆ∆(qˆ) = ∆q(qˆ) = 0. The ex-
pression in square brackets on the right hand side of the inequality is strictly
positive (and exceeds unity). The left hand side of inequality (29) is always
strictly positive, whereas the right hand side goes to minus infinity as q ap-
proaches qˆ (from the right). Thus, inequality (29) necessarily holds not only
for q = qˆ (see (i) above) but also for q “close” to qˆ.35 Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3. According to (10’), the first best level of
public goods provision is given by
gG(G
∗; Ψ) =
v˜(qˆ, 1; γ)
N ζ
, (30)
35“Close” refers to inequality (29) and does not mean small tax rates.
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where ζ is defined as in the derivation of FOC (10) above.
From (16) we know that v˜(q, ω; γ) = v˜(qˆ, ω−EB−R+Rˆ; γ). Moreover,
Rˆ = (qˆ− 1) c˜(qˆ, ω−EB−R+ Rˆ; γ) = (qˆ− 1)(ω−EB−R) c˜(qˆ, 1; γ)+ (qˆ−
1) Rˆ c˜(qˆ, 1; γ) (by homotheticity). Using ζ, Rˆ = (1 − ζ)/ζ (ω − EB − R),
thus, (ω−EB−R) + Rˆ = (ω−EB−R)/ζ. It follows v˜(q, ω; γ) = v˜(qˆ, ω−
EB − R; γ)/ζ (using homotheticity again). The government’s problem, in
the second-best case, therefore becomes:
{q, G} ≡ argmax
q,G
{v˜(qˆ, ω − EB −R; γ)/ζ + g(G; Ψ) |N R = G} .
Notice that Rq > 0 by assumption (A.6), andMEB = EBq/Rq (see footnote
17). Thus, the government’s problem gives rise to the following first order
condition:
gG(G
∗∗; Ψ) =
v˜(qˆ, 1; γ)
N ζ
[1 +MEB(q, ω; γ)] . (31)
From (30) and (31) follows that G∗∗ R G∗ ⇔MEB(q, ω; γ) S 0. Q.E.D.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4. The first order condition (10’) determines the
optimal level of public goods provision. Notice that the government budget
constraint implies: (ω − t∗) ζ = ω −G∗/N . Thus, (10’) can be written as:
N gG(G; Ψ) =
v˜(qˆ, 1; γ)
ζ
=
(ω − t∗) v˜(qˆ, 1; γ)
(ω − t∗) ζ =
v˜(qˆ, ω − t∗; γ)
ω −G∗/N
=
v˜(1, ω −G∗/N ; 0)
ω −G∗/N =
(ω −G∗/N) v˜(1, 1; 0)
ω −G∗/N = v˜(1, 1; 0) .
Observe that the right hand side of the first order condition is independent
of both γ and Ψ. Implicit differentiation of the first order condition with
respect to Ψ and γ yields:
dΨ
d γ
|MEB=0 = −gG,G(G; Ψ)N [Rq|q=qˆ qˆγ + (qˆ − 1) c˜γ(qˆ, ω; γ)]
gG,Ψ(G; Ψ)
> 0 . (32)
Observe that gG,G(G; Ψ) < 0, gG,Ψ(G; Ψ) > 0 (from (A.5)), Rq > 0 (by
(A.6)), c˜γ > 0, and the corrective tax rate increases in γ, (qˆγ > 0). Thus,
(dΨ)/(d γ)|MEB=0 > 0. I.e., (32) implicitly defines a relationship: Ψ = Ψ(γ).
Finally, Ψ(0) = 0. Since MEB = 0 along the locus Ψ = Ψ(γ), we know that
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G∗ = G∗∗. At γ = 0, G∗ = G∗∗ = (qˆ − 1) c˜(qˆ, ω; 0) = (1 − 1)c˜(1, ω; 0) = 0,
which is obviously fulfilled for Ψ = 0 only. Q.E.D.
A.8 Benchmark Data.
[Table A.1 here]
A.9 MCF and MEB. We can write (16) as:
v˜(q+dq, ω; γ) = v˜(qˆ, ω+ Rˆ(q)+d Rˆ−R(q)−dR−EB(q)−dEB; γ) . (33)
Expanding the left hand side by a Taylor expansion around (q, ω; γ), and the
right hand side by a Taylor expansion around (qˆ, ω + Rˆ − R − EB; γ), and
approximating to first-order terms, yield:
v˜q(q, ω; γ)d q = −v˜ω(qˆ, ω + Rˆ(q)−R(q)− EB(q); γ) (dR + dEB − d Rˆ) .
As Rˆ = (qˆ − 1)c˜(qˆ, 1; γ)[ω − EB − (R − Rˆ)], it follows: Rˆ = (ω − EB −
R)(1− ζ)/ζ. Therefore, (dEB + dR− d Rˆ) = (dEB + dR)/ζ. Recognizing
further that v˜ω(qˆ, ω + R(qˆ) − R(q) − EB(q); γ) = v˜(qˆ, 1; γ), and observing
that (dR + dEB)/dR = (1 +MEB) we know:
v˜(qˆ, 1; γ) (1 +MEB)/ζ = −v˜q(q, ω; γ) /(dR/d q) (34)
If we measure the welfare loss (MCF) by the compensating variation, dω,
we note: v˜(q, ω; γ) = v˜(q + d q, ω + dω; γ). Expanding the right hand side
around (q, ω; γ) and approximating to first-order terms:
v˜(q, ω; γ) = v˜(q, ω; γ) + v˜q(q, ω; γ)d q + v˜ω(q, ω; γ)dω . (35)
From the government budget constraint it follows that [1 + ∂ R/∂ G]dG =
[∂ R/∂ q]d q. The separability assumption implies: ∂ R/∂ G = 0. Therefore,
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d q = dG/[∂ R/∂ q]. Using this equation in (35) and considering v˜ω(q, ω; γ) =
v˜(q, 1; γ) (by homogeneity) yields:
MCF =
dω
dG
= − v˜q(q, ω; γ)
v˜(q, 1; γ)
/
∂ R
∂ q
. (36)
The MCF is equivalent to the ratio of additional tax revenue that would
have been raised if there were no behavioral responses to the actual revenues
collected. The difference between numerator and denominator is caused by
the substitution effect.
Taking (34) and (36) together gives the relationship between the marginal
excess burden and the marginal cost of funds:
v˜(qˆ, 1; γ)
v˜(q, 1; γ)
(1 +MEB)
ζ
=MCF .
References
[1] Abel, A.B., 1990. Asset Pricing under Habit Formation and Catching
up with the Joneses. American Economic Review 80, 38–42.
[2] Abel, A.B., 1999. Risk Premia and Term Premia in General Equilibrium.
Journal of Monetary Economics 43, 3–33.
[3] Abel, A.B., 2005. Optimal Taxation when Consumers have Endogenous
Benchmark Levels of Consumption. Review of Economic Studies 72, 21–
42.
[4] Alpizar, F., Carlsson, F., Johansson-Stenman, O., 2005. How Much Do
We Care About Absolute versus Relative Income and Consumption?
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 56, 405–421.
47
[5] Atkinson, A.B., Stern, N.H., 1974. Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods.
Review of Economic Studies 41, 119–128.
[6] Barten, A.P., Boehm, V., 1982. Consumer Theory. In: Arrow, K.J.,
Intrilligator, M.D. (Eds.). Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Vol.
II. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 381–429.
[7] Ballard, C.L., Shoven, J.B., Whalley, J., 1985. General Equilibrium
Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United
States. American Economic Review 75, 128–138.
[8] Bartolome´, C.A.M., 1999. Integrating Tax Distortions and Externality
Theory. Journal of Public Economic Theory 1, 339–358.
[9] Bartolome´, C.A.M., 2001. Is Pigou Wrong? Can Distortionary Taxation
Cause Public Spending to Exceed the Efficient Level? Mimeo. Colorado:
University of Boulder.
[10] Batina, R.G., 1990. On the Interpretation of the Modified Samuelson
Rule for Public Goods in Static Models with Heterogeneity. Journal of
Public Economics 42, 125–133.
[11] Batina, R.G., Ihori, T., 2005. Public Goods. Theories and Evidence.
Berlin et al.: Springer.
[12] Blundell, R., 1992. Labour Supply and Taxation: A Survey. Fiscal Stud-
ies 13, 15–40.
48
[13] Boskin, M.J., Sheshinsky, E., 1978. Optimal Redistributive Taxation
When Individual Welfare Depends upon Relative Income. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 92, 589–601.
[14] Brekke, K.A., Howarth, R.B., 2002. Status, Growth and the Environ-
ment. Goods as Symbols in Applied Welfare Economics. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
[15] Browning, E.K., 1976. The Marginal Cost of Public Funds. Journal of
Political Economy 84, 283–298.
[16] Campbell, H., 1975. Deadweight Loss and Commodity Taxation in
Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics 8, 441–446.
[17] Carlsson, F., Johansson-Stenman, O., Martinsson, P., 2003. Do You
Enjoy Having More than Others? Survey Evidence of Positional Goods.
Working Papers in Economics 100, Go¨teborg University, Sweden.
[18] Carroll, C.D., Overland, J., Weil, D.N., 1997. Comparison Utility in a
Growth Model. Journal of Economic Growth 2, 339–367.
[19] Chang, M.C., 2000. Rules and Levels in the Provision of Public Goods:
The Role of Complementarities between the Public Good and Taxed
Commodities. International Tax and Public Finance 7, 83–91.
[20] Diamond, P., Mirrlees, J. 1971. Optimal Taxation and Public Produc-
tion I and II. American Economic Review 61, 8–27, 261–278.
49
[21] Dierker, W.E., 1982. Duality Approaches to Microeconomic Theory. In:
Arrow, K.J., Intrilligator, M.D. (Eds.). Handbook of Mathematical Eco-
nomics, Vol. II. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 535–600.
[22] Dupor, B., Liu, W.F., 2003. Jealousy and Equilibrium Overconsump-
tion. American Economic Review 93, 423 – 428.
[23] Easterlin, R.A., 1995. Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Hap-
piness of All? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 27, 35–47.
[24] Feldstein, M., 1997. How Big Should Government Be? National Tax
Journal 50, 197–213.
[25] Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A., 2005. Income and Well-Being: An Empirical
Analysis of the Comparison Income Effect. Journal of Public Economics
89, 997–1019.
[26] Frank, R.H., 1985. Choosing the Right Pond. Human Behavior and the
Quest for Status. New York: Oxford University Press.
[27] Frank, R.H., 1999. Luxury Fever. Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era
of Excess. New York: The Free Press.
[28] Gaube, T., 2000. When Do Distortionary Taxes Reduce the Optimal
Supply of Public Goods? Journal of Public Economics 76, 151–180.
[29] Gaube, T., 2005. Financing Public Goods with Income Taxation: Pro-
vision Rules vs. Provision Level. International Tax and Public Finance
12, 319–334.
50
[30] Gronberg, T., Liu, L., 2001. The Second-Best Level of a Public Good:
An Approach Based on the Marginal Excess Burden. Journal of Public
Economic Theory 3, 431 – 453.
[31] Hansson, I., Stuart, C., 1985. Tax Revenue and the Marginal Cost of
Public Funds in Sweden. Journal of Public Economics 27, 331–353.
[32] Hirsch, F., 1976. The Social Limits to Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press.
[33] Johansson-Stenman, O., Martinsson, P., 2006. Honestly, Why are You
Driving a BMW? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 60,
129–146.
[34] Johansson-Stenman, O., Carlsson, F., Daruvala, D., 2002. Measuring
Future Grandparents’ Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing.
Economic Journal 112, 362–383.
[35] King, M.A., 1986. A Pigouvian Rule for the Optimum Provision of Pub-
lic Goods. Journal of Public Economics 30, 273–291.
[36] Layard, R., 1980. Human Satisfactions and Public Policy. Economic
Journal 90, 737—750.
[37] Layard, R., 2006. Happiness and Public Policy: A Challenge to the
Profession. Economic Journal 116, C24–C33.
[38] Liu, W.F., Turnovsky, S.J., 2005. Consumption Externalities, Produc-
tion Externalities, and Long-Run Macroeconomic Efficiency. Journal of
Public Economics 89, 1097–1129.
51
[39] Luttmer, E.F.P., 2005. Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and
Well-Being, Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 963–1002.
[40] Miller, J., Ulrich, R., 2001. On the Analysis of Psychometric Functions:
The Spearman-Ka¨rber Method. Perception and Psychophysics 63, 1399–
1420.
[41] McBride, M., 2001. Relative-Income Effects on Subjective Well-Being
in the Cross-Section. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 45,
251–278.
[42] Neumark, D., Postlewaite, A., 1998. Relative Income Concerns and the
Rise in Married Women’s Employment. Journal of Public Economics 70,
157–183.
[43] Ng, Y.K., 1980. Optimal Corrective Taxes or Subsidies when Revenue
Raising Imposes an Excess Burden. American Economic Review 70, 744–
751.
[44] Ng, Y.K., 1987. Relative-Income Effects and the Appropriate Level of
Public Expenditure. Oxford Economic Papers 39, 293–300.
[45] Ng, Y.K., 2000. The Optimal Size of Public Spending and the Distor-
tionary Cost of Taxation. National Tax Journal 53, 253–272.
[46] Ng, Y.K., Wang, J., 1993. Relative Income, Aspiration, Environmental
Quality, Individual and Political Myopia. Why May the Rat-Race for
Marterial Growth be Welfare-Reducing? Mathematical Social Sciences.
26, 3–23.
52
[47] Pigou, A., 1947. A Study in Public Finance (3rd edn). London: Macmil-
lan.
[48] Sandmo, A., 1975. Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities.
Swedish Journal of Economics 77, 86–98.
[49] Scitovsky, T., 1976. The Joyless Economy. An Investigation intoHuman
Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
[50] Slemrod, J., Yitzhaki, S., 2001. Integrating Expenditure and Tax Deci-
sions: The Marginal Cost of Funds and the Marginal Benefit of Projects.
National Tax Journal 54, 189–201.
[51] Solnick, S.J., Hemenway, D., 1998. Is More Always Better? A Survey
on Positional Concerns. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
37, 373–383.
[52] Solnick, S.J., Hemenway, D., 2005. Are Positional Concerns Stronger in
Some Domains than in Others? American Economic Review 95, 147–
151.
[53] Stiglitz, J.E., Dasgupta, P., 1971. Differential Taxation, Public Goods,
and Economic Efficiency. Review of Eonomic Studies 38, 151–174.
[54] Wildasin, D.E., 1984. On Public Good Provision with Distortionary
Taxation. Economic Inquiry 22, 227–585.
[55] Wilson, J.D., 1991a. Optimal Public Good Provision and the Ramsey
Tax Model. Economics Letters 35, 57–61.
53
[56] Wilson, J.D., 1991b. Optimal Public Good Provision with Limited
Lump-Sum Taxation. American Economic Review 81, 153–166.
[57] USEPA, 1993. Methods for Measuring the Acute Toxicity of Eﬄu-
ents and Receiving Waters to Freshwater and Marine Organisms.
EPA/600/4-90/027F. Washington: United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency.
54
TABLE 1
Empirical Estimates of Status Effects
Study Remarks # Method Probit
Analysis
Spearman-
Karber
γ γ
Alpizar et al.
(2005)
7 R-states with differing
implicit degrees of posi-
tionality (γ¯i)
283 A 0.43
(0.37 – 0.48)
0.49
(0.47 – 0.52)
Carlsson et al.
(2003)
3 data sets with different
γ¯i
329 A 0.65
(0.54 – 0.76)
0.53
(0.50 – 0.57)
Johansson-
Stenman
et al. (2002)
7 different γ¯i; low income
and high income versions
of the questionnaire in
addition
356 A 0.36
(0.33 – 0.39)
0.39
(0.37 – 0.41)
“Low income” sample,
same γ¯i as above but
lower individual income
levels
90 A 0.37
(0.33 – 0.42)
0.37
(0.34 – 0.42)
“High income” sample,
same γ¯i as above but
higher individual income
levels
90 A 0.22
(0.15 – 0.28)
0.31
(0.27 – 0.35)
Solnick and
Hemenway
(1998)
1 R state; probit sensi-
tivity (see footnote 27):
E[γ] = 0.26 (0.12 – 0.39)
238 B 0.28
(0.18 – 0.37)
0.23
(0.21 – 0.25)
Solnick and
Hemenway
(2005)
1 implicit degree of po-
sitionality; probit sensi-
tivity (see footnote 27):
E[γ] = 0.15 (0.02 – 0.29)
226 B 0.20
(0.10 – 0.30)
0.21
(0.18 – 0.23)
Notes.– # refers to the number of respondents. Numbers in brackets below the estimates
of E[γ] indicate the 95% confidence intervals. γ¯ is the implicit degree of positionality (γ for
which, according to (20), the data yield the same utility for both states A and R).
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TABLE 2
Marginal Excess Burden and Status Effects
Parameter Set IA Parameter Set IB
γ γ
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.2 0.07 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 0.09 0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.11
τ 0.3 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 -0.06
0.4 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.00
0.5 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.27 0.23 0.18 0.13 0.07
Parameter Set IIA Parameter Set IIB
0.2 0.17 0.09 0.00 -0.09 -0.18 0.28 0.14 0.00 -0.14 -0.27
τ 0.3 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 -0.10 0.51 0.34 0.17 0.00 -0.16
0.4 0.46 0.35 0.24 0.12 0.00 0.88 0.66 0.43 0.22 0.00
0.5 0.70 0.56 0.43 0.29 0.15 1.57 1.23 0.91 0.59 0.28
Note.– The marginal excess burden equals zero when the tax rate corresponds to the
corrective tax rate. This is this case where τ = γ for the employed utility function. The
parameters underlying the simulations are shown in Table A.1 in the appendix.
TABLE A.1
Calibrated Parameter Values
εcL γ β σ Set
0.3 0.0 2.813 0.500 IA
0.3 0.3 3.107 0.629 IB
0.7 0.0 1.371 1.167 IIA
0.7 0.3 1.754 1.467 IIB
Note. α = 1, τ = 0.2, (ω − l)/ω = 0.4.
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Figure 1: Preferences, MEB, and G∗, G∗∗
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